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Looking to the North While Playing
Doctor: Solving the H-1B Visa Problem by
Following Canada's Lead
Sarah Jain
In the late twentieth century, the United States high
technology industry began an explosive growth spurt that has
carried through the turn of the century.' The rapidly evolving
state of technology, 2 coupled with the shortage of skilled
American workers, 3 has driven United States employers to
import high technology talent from abroad. 4 Foreign technology
workers most frequently receive authorization to work in the
United States through the H-1B visa program.5 The United
States government's limited offerings of working visas
contribute to the H-1B's immense popularity.6 Instead of
creating an efficient marketplace, the complex, protectionist H-
1B program stifles the growth of high technology companies,
and in turn, asphyxiates the U.S. economy.
This Note examines the H-1B visa program as it applies to
the information technology (IT) sector of the United States
1. See Steve Lohr, Computer Age Gains Respect of Economists, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 14, 1999, at Al; Pam Woodall, A Survey of the New Economy: Labour Pains:
Wanted: More Brains, Less Brawn, ECONOMIST, Sept. 23, 2000, at 66; Peter Behr,
How Virginia Has Fed on a High-Tech Diet, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 1999, at F32.
2. See Pam Woodall, A Survey of the New Economy: Untangling E-conomics,
ECONOMIST, Sept. 23, 2000, at 66.
3. See infra Part I.A for a discussion of the worker shortage.
4. See A. James V~zquez-Azpiri, Through the Eye of a Needle: Canadian
Information Technology Professionals and the TN Category of the NAFTA, 77
INTERPRETER RELEASES 805, 807 (June 26, 2000).
5. See id.
6. The other working visa programs are quite restrictive. For example, TN
visas, created by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), are only for
citizens of Canada and Mexico. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.6 (2000). L-1 visas are only viable
for intracompany transferees. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(12)(i) (2000). E-1 visas are
strictly for treaty traders and the related E-2 visas only for treaty investors. See 8
C.F.R. § 214.2(e)(3) (2000). And, F-i visas are for students and allow for limited
employment authorization. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(1)(i) (2000).
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economy. Part I of this Note provides a survey of the high
technology worker shortage, a background of the H-1B visa
program, and an examination of the program's flaws. Part II
outlines the Canadian program for foreign workers in the IT
industry and proposes adopting certain Canadian policies to
facilitate the entry of foreign workers in the IT sector.
I. AFFIXING THE TOURNIQUET: USING H-1B VISAS TO
STEM THE FLOW OF FOREIGN TEMPORARY WORKERS
INTO THE UNITED STATES
During the late 1990s, H-1B proponent employers in the IT
industry complained of a labor shortage, while H-1B opponents
proclaimed the antithesis. Congress, in the middle of this battle,
needed to discern the reality of the labor shortage and consider
the shortcomings of the H-1B visa program before legislating its
most recent remedy, which ameliorates some of the most
pressing problems of the H-1B visa crisis. Unfortunately,
pervasive ills persist.
A. TAKING THE ECONOMIC PULSE: DIAGNOSING THE REALITY
OF THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY LABOR SHORTAGE AND THE
ACTUAL NEED
Compelling evidence exists supporting the criticism that the
current United States visa process is partially responsible for
the shortage of qualified high technology workers. By all
accounts, the American economy reached a strong crescendo in
the late 1990s leaving unemployment at a thirty-year low.7
Currently, it takes an average of 12.5 weeks for an unemployed
worker to get a job, down from 13.8 weeks the previous year.s
More specifically, the IT industry has been booming.9 From
7. See Benefits to the American Economy of a More Educated Workforce:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 7 (1999) (hereinafter Benefits to the American Economy of
a More Educated Workforce) (recording U.S. unemployment at record low levels of
4.3%). See also Janet Purdy Levaux, How to Tap into the Skilled Immigrant Labor
Pool, INVESTOR'S BUS. DAILY, Mar. 29, 2000, at 10.
8. See Immigration and the Economy, 19 AILA'S IMMIGRATION LAW
TODAY 173, 175 (Apr. 2000).
9. See Benefits to the American Economy of a More Educated Workforce, supra
note 7, at 43, 45, 61 & 66. See also James D. Van Erden, People Aspects of
Technological Change: Immigration Issues, Labor Mobility, the Brain Drain, and R
& D-A U.S. Perspective, 25 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 53, 58 (1999) (stating that technology is
being developed so fast that the half-life of a software engineer is between 1 - 2
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1993-98 the economy gained 1.1 million jobs in the high
technology industry.10 A 1997 Bureau of Labor Statistics study
shows phenomenal growth rates of 118% for computer
scientists, 109% for computer engineers, and 103% for systems
analysts." Congress predicts that the United States will need
approximately twenty million workers between 1999 and 2026
to maintain a growth rate of 2.5%.12 However, technology-based
companies have had trouble fulfilling their needs for qualified
workers, 13 while at the same time, the number of U.S. citizens
who are also highly-skilled graduates has declined. 14 The hottest
new industries, including microelectronics, Internet
technologies and electronic commerce "require a highly skilled,
knowledge-based workforce." 15 Furthermore, companies in the
United States have spent over sixty billion dollars on formal
training for their employees. 16 These facts lead to the conclusion
that the demand for highly skilled technology workers exceeds
its supply under the current immigration laws.
This skills shortage, coupled with the many problems
involved in H-1B visa processing, 7 leads to dire consequences.
Economic experts caution that the lack of qualified workers will
hinder the economy by curtailing business expansion, curbing
profits and stimulating inflation.' Other consequences include
companies moving production facilities and jobs out of the
United States to countries where qualified workers are more
abundant and easily employable. 19 This results in talented
years; in addition, by the year 2000, half of the world's scientific engineering
knowledge will have been generated in the previous seven years).
10. See Benefits to the American Economy of a More Educated Workforce, supra
note 7, at 43.
11. See id. at 65.
12. See id. at 66.
13. See Gates Laments Tech Worker Shortage, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 2,
1998.
14. See Benefits to the American Economy of a More Educated Workforce, supra
note 7, at 46, (citing that from 1990-96, the number of high-technology degrees
awarded to U.S. students fell five percent, from 219,000 to 208,000, while electrical
engineering degrees declined more than twenty-two percent).
15. See id. at 45.
16. See id. at 66.
17. See infra Part I.C.
18. See Studies Affirm Immigrants Essential to Economic Boom, 19 AILA'S
IMMIGRATION LAW TODAY 359 (July/Aug. 2000).
19. See Julekha Dash & Patrick Thibodeau, Election Politics Stall H-1B Hike;
If Cap Not Raised, Work May Move Offshore, COMPUTERWORLD, Sept. 11, 2000,
at 95 (stating that "more than one-third of 42 Fortune 500 companies surveyed by
EPF [Employment Policy Foundation] said they would move jobs out of the U.S. if
H-1B workers weren't available").
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foreign technology workers being lured away from companies in
the United States by companies in countries with less restrictive
immigration processes. 20 These possibilities lend a sense of
urgency to the pleas of H-1B employers and have garnered
congressional attention.
Although the bulk of information affirms the U.S. labor
shortage in the IT sector, a steady voice has been heard from the
other side. Representatives from the AFL-CIO have cried foul,
asserting that enough qualified American workers exist to fill
the ranks.21 In fact, pro-labor forces scoff at the so-called
desperate employers, arguing that many of the largest high-
technology companies are inundated with resumes and reject
the vast majority of applicants. 22 These opponents of the H-1B
program also maintain that employers' interests only lie in the
younger, cheaper labor source that H-1B visas provide, 23
resulting in discrimination against available, but older,
workers.24 Additionally, it is argued that H-1B workers can be
20. See Levaux, supra note 7, at 10 (reporting that countries such as Canada,
Israel and Ireland may try to attract high-tech talent with prospects of swift
citizenship processes); see also Benefits to the American Economy of a More Educated
Workforce, supra note 7, at 34 (stating that the Canadian and Australian
immigration systems "work very well. They are very important in getting high
skilled workers into those countries, in particular high skilled workers who would
really rather come to the United States, but cannot because of our Immigration
Laws. So, we are actually subsidizing Canada, Australia, and other countries").
21. See Doug White, Letter to the Editor, High-Tech Labor Wars, WASH.
POST, Sept. 22, 2000, at A24 (asserting that the Department of Education statistics
indicate that there are 300,000 U.S. graduates in math, computer science, and
engineering each year, and that this is sufficient to fill the estimated 204,000 high-
tech job opportunities each year).
22. See Norman Matloff, High-Tech Cheap Labor, WASH. POST, Sept. 12,
2000, at A35 (reporting that "Cisco receives 20,000 applications per month but hires
only 5 percent of the applicants;" Microsoft hires only 2 percent, Qualcomm 5
percent, and Red Hat Linux a measly 1 percent).
23. See Norman Matloff, High-Tech Cheap Labor, WASH. POST, Sept. 12,
2000, at A35 (claiming that the law requiring employers to pay the prevailing wage
is "riddled with loopholes"). But see Brian John Halliday, In Order to Hire the Best
Person for the Job, We Have to Do What?, 11 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 33, 42
(1999) (asserting that prevailing wage issues rarely arise since most employers pay
above that rate, and the fact that employers are willing to suffer through the
arduous H-1B process shows there is a lack of qualified U.S. citizens available;
consequently, qualified foreign nationals are able to demand higher salaries and
employers must pay them).
24. See Immigration and America's Workforce for the 21st Century: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 105th Cong. 60-61 (1998) (statement of David A. Smith, Director of
Policy, AFL-CIO). But see Dash & Thibodeau, supra note 19, at 95 (noting that many
older programmers with basic skills are simply not qualified for jobs which require
knowledge of newer, cutting-edge programming languages).
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compared to indentured servants because the system makes
changing jobs cumbersome and keeps mobility to a minimum.25
Finally, some employers do not maintain interest in the H-1B
talent, calling it an "addictive quick fix." 26 Instead, they have
focused their energy inward and are developing their current
employees. 27
B. THE WAY WE WERE: DEFINING THE H-1B VISA AS IT
EXISTED BEFORE THE FALL 2000 LEGISLATIVE FLURRY
The United States' immigration legislation concerning
temporary foreign workers has long been extremely
protectionist in nature.28 Congress has crafted it to protect the
U.S. labor force and to allow foreign temporary workers to enter
the U.S. only when their admittance serves the national
economy, cultural interests, or welfare. 29  The H-1B
nonimmigrant, working visa is a vivid example of this
protectionist legislation. As set forth in the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA),30 an alien cannot receive the H-1B visa
25. See Joel Stewart, Editorial, High-Tech Labor Wars, WASH. POST, Sept. 22,
2000, at A24. But see INS to Conduct Audit of H-1B Program; Senator Abraham
Urges Broader Inquiry 77 INTERPRETER RELEASES 90, 91 (Jan. 14, 2000)
(demonstrating that H-1B workers are not indentured servants as approximately
one-third of H-1B visa holders change employers during their stays).
26. See Lisa Vaas, H-1B Vetoed, Called Stopgap by Companies--Some
Businesses Resist Turning H-lB-Dependent; Industry Trend or Event, PC WEEK,
May 1, 2000, at 61, 61; DAVID S. NORTH, NONIMMIGRANT WORKERS IN THE
U.S.: CURRENT TRENDS AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS 168 (1980).
27. See Vaas, supra note 26.
28. See Gannet Corp. v. Stevens, 282 F. Supp. 437, 445 (V.I. 1968) (holding
Virgin Islands Employment Act, which gave resident workers preference in
employment over nonresident workers and required importing employers to certify
that residents' wages or working conditions would not be adversely effected, did not
conflict with the Immigration and Nationality Act).
29. See id. See also JAMES G. GIMPEL & JAMES R. EDWARDS, JR., THE
CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION REFORM 61 (1999).
30. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1999) (hereinafter "INA"). The Immigration and
Nationality Act was established by Congress in 1952. Since that time, it has evolved
through several notable amendments: the Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1999));
the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990) (codified at
8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1999)); the Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and
Naturalization Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-232, 105 Stat. 1733 (1991)
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1999)); the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C., 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996)
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1999)); and the American Competitiveness and
Workforce Improvement Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, Title IV of Div. C, 112
Stat. 2681 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1999)) [hereinafter ACWIA].
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unless she "is coming temporarily to the United States to
perform services ... in a specialty occupation." 31 A "specialty
occupation" requires "theoretical and practical application of a
body of highly specialized knowledge" and "attainment of a
bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its
equivalent) as a minimum" requirement to perform the job.32
The regulations indicate that the specialty occupations include,
but are not limited to, "architecture, engineering, mathematics,
physical sciences, social sciences, medicine and health,
education, business specialties, accounting, law, theology, and
the arts."33 Thus, an important aspect of the H-1B program is
that it applies to a wide variety of professions.
The Hi-B visa allows temporary employment for a period of
up to six years34 and embodies the idea of a "dual intent." Dual
intent includes the intent to work temporarily and a
simultaneous intent to possibly stay permanently in the United
States.35 The notion of "dual intent" provides a major advantage
as it allows the foreign worker to adjust to permanent residency
through an employment-based application and thereby continue
the employment. However, "dual intent" is not attached to all
nonimmigrant visas. For example, H-2 visas for agricultural
workers and H-3 visas for trainees embody only temporary
intent.36 To obtain one of these visas, the alien must prove to the
consular officer that he or she has purely temporary intent, not
the presumed immigrant intent, and, a residence abroad which
he or she does not intend to abandon. 37
Another essential part of the H-1B procedure is its process.
The H-1B process begins with the employer filing a Labor
Condition Application (hereinafter "LCA") with the Department
31. INA § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) (1999). The
statute explains that H-1B visas may be obtained for foreign workers in the general
category of "specialty occupations," and the specific category of "fashion models." See
id. This Note will not discuss the H-1B visas for fashion models, only "specialty
occupations," particularly those in the IT sector.
32. INA § 214(i)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1) (1999). Pursuant to § 214(i)(2), a
person may meet the degree requirements by obtaining full state licensure to
practice the occupation, by completing the degree for the occupation, or by obtaining
experience equivalent to the degree and holding progressively responsible positions.
33. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) (2000).
34. See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)(4) (2000).
35. See INA § 214(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(h) (2000); INA § 214(b), 8 U.S.C. §
1184(b) (2000); see, e.g., 1997-98 IMMIGR. & NATIONALITY HANDBOOK
VOLUME I 145, 145-46 (R. Patrick Murphy et al. eds., 1997).
36. See 1997-98 IMMIGR. & NATIONALITY HANDBOOK VOLUME I, supra
note 35, at 145-46.
37. See id.
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of Labor (hereinafter "DOL"). The LCA certifies that the
employer will offer the foreign worker the actual wage 38 or the
prevailing wage,39  whichever is greater, and that the
employment of the foreign worker will not adversely affect the
working conditions of the employer's U.S. employees. 40 The
employer must certify that there is no strike or lockout taking
place, and that the collective bargaining representative has been
notified. 41 The INA also requires that foreign workers receive
the same benefits as the other workers and establishes a
complaint policy for LCA violations and the requisite
penalties.42 Finally, H-1B dependent employers must certify
that they have taken good faith steps to recruit American
workers for the job, and that they have offered the job to any
United States worker who applies and is equally or better
qualified than the foreign worker. 43
When the LCA is approved by the DOL, the employer then
files the H-1B petition with the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS)44 with the required $500 fee for each petition.45
Since the actual and prevailing wages are based upon the
particular job title or position and geographic area of
employment, the wages may vary if the foreign worker changes
38. The actual wage is the wage "paid by the employer to all other individuals
with similar experience and qualifications for the specific employment in question."
INA § 212(n)(1)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (n)(1)(A)(i)(I)(1999).
39. The prevailing wage equals the wage paid for the specific "occupational
classification in the area of employment." INA § 212(n)(1)(A)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1182
(n)(1)(A)(i)(II) (1999).
40. See INA § 212(n)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (n)(1)(A)(ii) (1999); 20 C.F.R. §
655.730 (1999).
41. See INA § 212(n)(1)(B) & (C), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (n)(1)(B) & (C)(1) (1999).
42. See INA § 212(n), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (n)(2)(A) (1999).
43. See INA § 212(n)(1)(G)(i)(I) & (II), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1)(G)(i)(I) & (II)
(1999). The comparison of the employer's size and the number or percentage of H-1B
employees determines whether an employer is H-1B dependent. See INA §
212(n)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(3)(A) (1999). Experts predict that the rules
governing H-1B dependent employers will mainly affect large employers that act as
job contractors in the computer services area. See AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN ET AL.,
IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION HANDBOOK COVERING THE ILLEGAL
IMMIGRANT, WELFARE AND ANTITERRORISM LAWS 12-16 (1999).
44. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i) (2000). See also Halliday, supra note 23, at 45
(noting that it may take one to four months to process the LCA and H-lB petition).
45. See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c) (2000). This fee was added by the ACWIA
amendment of 1998 and is in addition to the normal filing fee for Form 1-129,
Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker. The purpose of the $500 fee is to fund job
training; scholarships for low-income students enrolled in a mathematics, computer
science or engineering programs; and National Science Foundation grants. In
addition, six percent of the amount collected will fund administration and
enforcement of the H-1B program. See 8 U.S.C. § 1356 (2000).
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positions or work sites.46 If a change like this or any other
material change in employment occurs, the employer has the
burden of filing another LCA with the DOL and a new or
amended H-1B petition with the INS.47 If the foreign worker
wishes to change employers, the prospective employer must file
a new LCA and H-1B petition and have it approved before the
foreign worker may begin working for the new employer.48 Thus,
the employer ends up dealing with two federal agencies and a
myriad of complex rules in this process. 49
C. CATALOGUING THE PERVASIVE ILLS OF THE H-1B VISA
PROGRAM
Past Congressional responses to the adverse cries of
industry on one side and unions on the other have left a
pockmarked landscape in the H-1B law and led to numerous
implementation and feasibility difficulties. Basically, the H-1B
petition process is "a Byzantine rule that is hamstringing
employers and keeping them from conducting business in the
way companies normally do in this day and age."50
Some free market economists suggest that American
immigration policy should take on a more laissez faire flavor
with the goal of reducing discretionary government intervention
and encouraging outcomes caused by invisible market forces. 51
In this flexible system, a country would admit workers based on
human capital endowments. The likely losers in this system
would be the unskilled and poorly educated, who, under
46. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(I) (1999).
47. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(I) (1999); see also Laurie Grossman & Susan J.
Cohen, The Effect of Changed Circumstances on H-1B Nonimmigrant Workers, in
1997-98 IMMIGR. & NATIONALITY LAW HANDBOOK VOLUME II 186, 200-06
(1997) (detailing when a new LCA or H-1B petition must be filed in cases where
foreign workers change location, work at more than one location, and work for
multiple employers).
48. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(I) (1999).
49. See generally Jung S. Hahm, Note, American Competitiveness and
Workforce Improvement Act of 1998: Balancing Economic and Labor Interests Under
the New H-1B Visa Program, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1673, 1692-1701 (2000)
(discussing the problems faced by employers forced to deal with the DOL and INS
and proposing the consolidation of the supervisory responsibilities for the H-1B
program in the DOL).
50. Angelo A. Paparelli, LCA's/H-1B Nonimmigrant Visas, in 32nd ANNUAL
IMMIGR.& NATURALIZATION INST. 81, 107 (1999) (quoting immigration
attorney Eleanor Pelta).
51. See VERNON M. BRIGGS, JR., Mass Immigration, Free Trade and the
Forgotten American Worker, in IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN 20, 30 (1994).
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protectionism, could secure more highly paid positions.52
Although this paints a picture of seamless flows of intellectual
capital, an unfettered immigration policy, especially for
temporary workers, is an unlikely scenario.
Instead, American immigration policies, such as the H-1B
visa program, undoubtedly spawned from realist theory, which
suggests that countries allow the influx of foreigners to the
extent it advances economic, national and political interests.53
"[Political and economic interests of the state, including
military security, foreign relations, territorial integrity, and
national integration, drive the regulation of international
migration."54 With these realist interests in mind, Congress
created an incredibly complex H-1B law,55 spurning talent-
hungry employers and opportunistic foreign workers alike. The
H-1B law generates many problems, including ambiguous, time-
consuming procedures; quota restrictions; troubles in allocating
scholarship and training funds; and difficulties in adjusting
status to permanent residency.
The first major problems with the H-1B visa procedure are
its ambiguous nature and its complicated and restrictive
process. Immigration attorneys, employers, and anxious foreign
workers have aired their frustrations about dealing with the
capacious and dubious terms in both the DOL and INS
regulations. The terms in the regulations are often either
undefined (e.g. "material change") or defined differently in
several places (e.g. "employer"); thus, employers and their
attorneys find themselves scrutinizing DOL and INS policy
guidelines and advisory opinions from agency officials in an
attempt to understand the terms.5 6 Further, deciding whom the
"employer" is, and whether a new LCA or H-1B petition needs to
be filed, becomes especially problematic in the age of increased
mergers and acquisitions.57
52. See id. at 21.
53. See DEBRA L. DELAET, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY IN AN AGE OF
RIGHTS 6 (2000).
54. Id.
55. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
56. See Grossman & Cohen, supra note 47, at 191.
57. See Catherine Mayou, Mergers and Acquisitions in Today's Technology
Industry Driven Economy-Unanticipated Immigration Issues, 42 ORANGE
COUNTY LAWYER 6, 7-8 (July 2000) (stating that if after a merger or acquisition
any "material" change occurs, such as a change in the federal tax identification
number or in the conditions of employment, the new entity as the "employer" must
file a new LCA and a new or amended H-1B petition for each foreign worker); see
also Grossman & Cohen, supra note 47, at 194; INS Advises on Corporate Changes
20011
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A second problem relates to the time and expense involved
in acquiring an H-1B visa. Requiring an employer to file an LCA
with the DOL certifying that the employer will pay the higher of
the actual or prevailing wage seems reasonable since it both
protects United States workers from employers importing cheap
foreign labor and foreign workers from being paid at low,
exploitative levels.58 However, it lashes the employer and the
anxiously awaiting employee by adding more time and expense
to the employment process. In addition, the law punishes
employers who are deemed H-1B dependent by requiring that
they take good faith steps to recruit American workers. 59
Spending precious time and energy on this step is arguably
wasteful and futile because a severe labor shortage exists in the
IT sector.60
The specific annual limit on the number of H-1B visas
issued constitutes another problem. 61 Due in part to the fierce
lobbying by the IT sector, the 1998 ACWIA amendment to the
Act increased the annual number of visas from 65,000 in fiscal
year 1998 to 115,000 in fiscal years 1999 and 2000.62
Unfortunately, the increase did little to satisfy the key
constituencies, particularly the IT industry.63 The year 2000
demonstrated clearly the sore inadequacy of the annual visa
and H-1B Workers, 77 INTERPRETER RELEASES 465, 478 (Apr. 10, 2000).
58. See INA § 212(n)(1)(A)(i)(I) & (II), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (n)(1)(A)(i)(I) & (II)
(1999); see also text accompanying notes 38-40.
59. See INA § 212(n)(1)(G)(i)(I) & (II), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1)(G)(i)(I) & (II)
(1999); see also text accompanying note 43.
60. See supra notes 9-16 and accompanying text.
61. See INA § 214(g)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)(1)(A) (2000). Many criticize these
quota numbers as arbitrary and unrelated to the true demand. See LYNN FRENDT
SHOTWELL, Temporary Worker Visa Policy: Meeting the Needs of the 21st Century,
in IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN 55, 56-57 (2000); CHARLES B. KEELY, Global
Human Resource Strategies: Firms, International Personnel, and Immigration Law,
in IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN 101, 111 (1999); DORIS M. MEISSNER ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION CHALLENGES IN A NEW ERA 15 (1993).
62. See id.
63. See Jeanne Malitz, A Need for Foreign-Born Professionals, SAN DIEGO
UNION TRIB., Sept. 24, 2000, at G-3 (reporting that IT employers in the San Diego
region were voicing concern over their worker shortages and immediate need for
more H-1B employees); The Trouble with H-1B, NAT'L J. TECH. DAILY (AM Ed.
Sept. 11, 2000) (describing the lobbying efforts of the Information Technology
Industry Council in urging passage of H-1B cap-raising legislation); Ann Pomeroy,
INS Loses Count of H-1B Visas Because of Computer Malfunction, SOC'Y FOR
HUM. RESOURCE MGMT, Dec. 1999, at 5 (detailing that the American Business
for Legal Immigration (ABLI) coalition of companies and business organizations
lobbied Congress and the President to raise the quota and alleviate the burden on
U.S. employers).
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allotment, for on March 21, 2000, the INS announced that the
annual H-1B limit of 115,000 visa approvals had been reached
for the entire fiscal year.6 Since the fiscal year begins on
October 1st of each year, this meant that the United States had
exceeded its visa approval limit less than halfway through the
year.65 This is the earliest point in a fiscal year that the quota
has been reached.6 6 When the INS finally announced in July
2000 that it had finished processing the last petitions for fiscal
year 2000, almost 30,000 petitions subject to the cap remained
pending to be deducted from the fiscal year 2001 cap.67
Eventually, high profile economists, such as Federal Reserve
Chairman Alan Greenspan, called for a review of the
immigration laws and a lifting of the H-1B visa cap.68 In an
effort to discern the real need, Congress commissioned two
reports from the National Science Foundation, the first
concerning older workers in the information technology field,
and the second concerning the IT labor market needs.69
Even the seemingly simple task of counting the number of
H-1B visas issued has snowballed into an embarrassing fiasco
for the INS. 70 Auditors from an accounting firm determined that
the INS issued between 21,888 and 23,385 H-1B visas in excess
of the fiscal year 1999 cap of 115,000.71 Both computer
malfunctions 72 and human error caused this miscalculation. The
human error stemmed from mistakenly including H-1B visa
holders who were temporarily outside of the U.S., H-1B visa
holders who changed employers, and multiple petitions filed on
behalf of a single beneficiary.7 3 Besides the double counting of
petitions which likely occurs, the audit also discovered that the
64. See INS Announces H-1B Cap Reached for FY 2000, Publishes Procedures
for Post-Cap Cases, 77 INTERPRETER RELEASES 369, 369-71 (Mar. 24, 2000).
65. See id. at 369.
66. See INS Cuts Off H-1B Filings Subject to Cap, 19 AILA's IMMIGR. LAW
TODAY 258 (May 2000).
67. See INS Announces Completion of H-1B Processing for FY 2000, 77
INTERPRETER RELEASES, 1081, 1087 (July 31, 2000).
68. See Greenspan Says U.S. Immigration Laws Should Be Reviewed in Light
of Labor Shortage, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE (Jan. 26, 2000).
69. See ACWIA, supra note 30, at §§ 417, 418.
70. See Ann Pomeroy, INS Loses Count of H-1B Visas Because of Computer
Malfunction, SOC'Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT, Dec. 1999, at 5.
71. See H-1B Audit Determines Over-Issuance Larger Than Initially Estimated;
INS Instructs on Petition Language, 77 INTERPRETER RELEASES 466 (Apr. 10,
2000).
72. See Pomeroy, supra note 70.
73. See INS to Conduct Audit of H-1B Program; Senator Abraham Urges
Broader Inquiry, 77 INTERPRETER RELEASES 90, 91-92 (Jan. 14, 2000).
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INS does not add revoked petitions (e.g. fraudulent) back into
the visa pool; in effect, this extinguishes the availability of the
visas before the quota is actually reached. 4 Former Senator,
Spencer Abraham, while in office, summarized that if counting
errors of the sort outlined above have been occurring and are
allowed to persist uncorrected, the effect will be to negate a
substantial portion of what Congress sought to do when it raised
the H-1B cap two years ago.7 5
Another criticism of the H-1B law concerns the $500 fee per
petition to fund scholarships and training, a provision that the
ACWIA amendment of 1998 recently instituted. 76 The funds are
being generated as planned; 77 however, critics contend that
these funds are doing little to help the IT worker shortage
because they are doled out slowly and allocated incorrectly. 78
Critics assert that the DOL has a history of focusing on groups
of people with few or no skills who are not viable IT candidates
in the immediate future. 79 In addition, since the DOL has been
very slow in doling out the funds, training programs are still in
their infancy, and employers are proclaiming that the programs
have not lessened their reliance on H-1B visas.8 0 In response to
the DOL's ineffective handling of funds, industry trade groups
and employers have proposed that the money be controlled by
more efficient "regional alliances that wed business, education
and labor unions."81
The final problem area in the H-1B law concerns the
74. See KPMG Issues Report on 1999 H-1B Count, 19 AILA'S IMMIGRATION
LAW TODAY 328 (June 2000).
75. See INS to Conduct Audit of H-1B Program; Senator Abraham Urges
Broader Inquiry, supra note 73, at 92.
76. See 8 U.S.C. § 1184 (2000).
77. See Bara Vaida, Labor Targets H-1B Fees to Lower-skilled Workers, NAT'L
J. TECH. DAILY, Sept. 29, 2000, PM ed. (explaining that the Department of Labor
has received approximately $171.5 million from H-1B visa fees to fund high-tech
focused scholarships and job training and has started distributing these funds for
the first time this year).
78. See Lisa Vaas, Failing Grades-H-1B Fees Fail to Lessen Reliance on
Imported IT Skills; Industry Trend or Event, EWEEK, Sept. 18, 2000, at 24 (stating
that the U.S. General Accounting Office has accused the DOL of allocating the funds
without precision because the Labor Department never determined exactly what IT
skills are needed in the domestic work force).
79. See id. at 28. The DOL admits that they train employees mainly for low
skill, entry-level positions. See id. See also Halliday, supra note 23 at 62-64
(asserting that the H-1B fee program is inadequate because the program still does
not generate enough money to put the needed number of workers through school and
that the training provided by the program is not equivalent to a high-level degree).
80. See Vaas, supra note 78.
81. See id.
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difficulties H-1B visa holders face when they attempt to adjust
status8 2 to permanent residency. Every year thousands of H-1B
workers and their families who qualify for green card status
have been forced to leave the United States because their six-
year H-1B visas expire8 3 before their permanent residency
petitions are approved.8 4 This unfortunate result is due to INS
processing delays and the restrictive permanent residency law
that allocates the same number of immigrant visas for each
country without regard to differences in population.8 5 In this
way, small countries, such as Jamaica, are offered the same
number of immigrant visas as large countries like India or
China. India and China both have large numbers of foreign
workers waiting to adjust their status, while some small
countries may not even exhaust their allotment.8 6 Critics argue
that legislation raising the H-1B cap must be combined with
measures to decrease the waiting time for permanent
residency.8 7 If the H-1B cap is raised, then the backlogs for
permanent residence would drastically increase,88 resulting in a
82. "Adjustment of status" refers to the change from a nonimmigrant visa
status, such as the H-1B, to an immigrant visa status, more commonly referred to as
permanent residency or obtaining a green card. See INA § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255
(1999).
83. See Mitchell L. Wexler, Needed Immigration Strategies for Hi Tech Talent,
42 ORANGE COUNTY LAWYER 14, 15 (2000) (suggesting that a possible, albeit
not very viable, strategy for a worker close to his or her six-year limit is to have the
H-1B worker leave the United States for one year, perhaps by assigning him or her
to a facility abroad, and upon returning the H-IB worker would get a renewed six-
year period).
84. See Scott Wright, Making Immigration Policy Work for Business, INT'L
BRIEFING, Sept. 8, 2000 (proposing to allow those H-1B holders who have applied
for permanent residency at least one year before their H-1B visa expires to stay in
the United States until their immigrant petition is approved or denied). See also
PHILIP MARTIN, Shortages, Wages and Qualified Workers: Options for Dealing
with Nonimmigrants, in 22 IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN 113, 114 (Lydro F.
Tomasi, ed., 1999) (noting the familiar aphorism that "there is nothing more
permanent than temporary workers," yet the H-1B law makes no concessions for
this reality).
85. See INA § 202(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a) (1999).
86. See also Wright, supra note 84 (explaining that the two largest sources of
skilled IT workers are from India and China).
87. See Carrie Kirby, Can't Get Action from INS? Canada Has a Deal for You,
SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Aug. 25, 2000, at A19 (explaining that it can take four
years or more to receive permanent residency status in the United States,
exhausting two-thirds of the six year maximum available on an H-1B visa).
88. See New H-1B Proposal Would Raise Cap, Boost Portability, Address
Lengthy LPR Adjudications, 77 INTERPRETER RELEASES 200 (Feb. 14, 2000)
(citing a press release for the Center for Immigration Studies which found that
backlogs for permanent residence would become unbearable "as close to one million
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pathetically small percentage of future H-1B holders obtaining
green card status.8 9
The United States Congress is painfully aware that it is
impossible to please everyone all of the time; however, it is
difficult to find even one soul who lauds the H-1B legislation:
One thing's for sure about the current laws governing H-1B visas: It's
hard to find anyone who's happy with them. IT employers are unhappy
because they want the annual 115,000 limit on H-1B visas increased,
and they want to take control of the retraining fees collected from H-
1B applications. Those active in H-1B legislative reform are unhappy
because they believe importing offshore IT talent is unfair to U.S.
workers and that retraining efforts funded by H-1B fees are little more
than a hollow gesture. Even government auditors are unhappy with
how the program is being run... because the Department of Labor
hasn't collected data on what specific IT skills are needed, [and] it
hasn't been able to allocate H-1B-generated retraining funds with
precision.
90
The short-sighted H-1B law is not the result of well-defined
and rationally planned considerations for the national interest.91
Rather, this legislation reflects the political sway of powerful,
well-organized interest groups. 92 Once again in October of 2000,
the interest groups persuaded Congress through their political
demands. 93 However, the resultant law is not necessarily
fraught with arcane and short-lived provisions since the
lobbying muscle now lies in the liberal-minded high technology
sector.
H-1B workers arrive by 2003 into an employment-based immigration system with
140,000 [annually] available slots").
89. See Shailesh Gala, Letter to the Editor, High-Tech Labor Wars, WASH.
POST, Sept. 22, 2000, at A24 (stating that if H-1B cap-raising legislation is enacted
without green card reform provisions, "less than fifteen percent of future H-lBs will
obtain permanent residence").
90. Lisa Vaas, What H-1B Bill Will Come Out Ahead?, EWEEK, Sept. 18, 2000,
at 28.
91. See DELAET, supra note 53, at 4.
92. The 1990s have engaged Congress in an especially volatile tug of war. See
id. at 105 (explaining that during the 1990s anti-immigration groups, such as the
Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR), grew and became more vocal);
GIMPEL & EDWARDS, supra note 29, at 46-47 (stating that during the 1990s IT
businesses began to lobby for immigration expansion; Microsoft, Intel, Motorola, Sun
Microsystems and Texas Instruments joined to form the American Business for
Legal Immigration (ABLI) Coalition).
93. See infra note 95 and accompanying text (legislation that is pre-
immigration for science-oriented and tech workers).
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D. ATTEMPTS To HEAL THE WOUNDED: EXAMINING THE NEW
RELIEF FOR THE H-1B VISA CRISIS
Congress responded to the many problems of the H-1B
program by passing an act to increase the H-1B education and
training fee from $500 to $1,000 per petition 94 and the American
Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000
(AC21). 95 The AC21 begins boldly by increasing the H-1B cap
from the 107,500 to 195,000 for Fiscal Years 2001 through
2003.96 Also included in this section is a provision that clears out
the pending case backlog from the previous year.97 This is
definitely a step in the right direction since it ensures that the
full 195,000 visas will be available for Fiscal Year 2001.
However, there is nothing to suggest that the 195,000 figure
was the product of careful economic analysis of anticipated
supply and demand.98 Retaining the cap is a restrictive measure
that hinders flexibility in the labor market and the booming
economy. 99
94. See Act to Increase the Fees Charged to Employers Who Are Petitioners of
H-1B Nonimmigrant Workers, Pub. L. No. 106-311 (Oct. 17, 2000).
95. See American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act, Pub. L.
No. 106-313 (Oct. 17, 2000) [hereinafter AC21]. AC21 includes the following major
provisions: (1) it raises the H-1B visa quota to 195,000 for FY2001-03; (2) it exempts
from the cap employees of higher educational institutions or related nonprofit
organizations while they are working for that employer; (3) it eases the per-country
immigrant visa limits and allows over-subscribed countries to utilize the unused
immigrant visas of other countries; (4) it allows extension of H-1B status for those
visa holders who have an immigrant visa petition pending; (5) it allows visa holders
to begin to work for a new employer when an application has been submitted
without waiting for approval; however, if denied, the authorization is terminated; (6)
it extends the H-1B dependent employer attestations and Department of Labor
investigation provisions; (7) it recovers fraudulently used visas and returns them to
the pool as unused; (8) it specifies the portions of education and training funds that
certain organizations will receive; (9) it requires the National Science Foundation to
conduct a study on the "digital divide," that is, to determine how technology access
impacts those in society who have it, versus those who do not; and finally, (10) it
outlines immigration services and infrastructure improvements. See id. See also
Statement by the President: Signing of the 'American Competitiveness in the Twenty-
First Century Act', U.S. NEWSWIRE, Oct. 17, 2000.
96. See AC21, supra note 95, at § 102(a).
97. See id. at § 102(b).
98. Thus, this legislation could result in another inadequate H-1B visa quota.
Since the IT sector is growing at such a phenomenal rate, this is not out of the realm
of possibility. Some suggest suspending the cap temporarily or eliminating it
entirely. See Halliday, supra note 23, at 72; Hahm, supra note 49, at 1677-78 (calling
for a relaxation of the visa cap).
99. See Statement by the President, supra note 95 (stating that his
"Administration has made clear that any increase in H-1B visas should be
temporary and limited in number").
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The next section makes impressive headway for employers
in higher educational institutions and nonprofit and
governmental research organizations by exempting their H-1B
employees from the cap.100 This presents good news for the high
technology industry for two reasons. First, those visas normally
used by higher education and research institutions will now be
available for high technology workers and other specialty
occupations. Second, the law exempts employees of higher
educational institutions "or a related or affiliated nonprofit
entity."101 This language may provide a loophole for technology
companies to establish foundations in conjunction with
universities and thereby exempt the employees who would work
there. Third, Congress has clearly delineated that H-1B holders
shall not be counted toward the cap again, unless they are
eligible for another full six-year period. 0 2 This counting rule will
overrule current INS practice of including H-1B workers who
are temporarily outside of the United States,'10 3 and hopefully
result in more consistent counting across the INS offices. The
prohibition against double counting essentially requires INS to
develop a reliable system to guard against this practice.
This same section of the law dashed the hopes of foreign
graduate students attending institutions in the United States
who were anxiously awaiting a similar exemption from the
cap. 104 Earlier bill proposals had incorporated an exemption
provision for foreign graduate students of United States
institutions. 05 However, the final act removed this student
exemption, but inadvertently left the words in the title. 0 6 This
is very unfortunate for these students and the American
economy, because these students could help ease the highly
skilled worker shortage. Further, there is no worry that these
students would flood the job market, since many of them have
already blended into the American workforce by holding full-
time jobs through student employment authorizations. 10 7 The
100. See AC21, supra note 95, at § 103. This section ensures higher educational




103. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
104. See AC21, supra note 95, § 103.
105. See, e.g., H.R. 3983, 106th Cong. (2000) and H.R 4200, 106th Cong. (2000).
106. See AC21, supra note 95, § 103. The taunting title announces "Special Rule
for Universities, Research Facilities, and Graduate Degree Recipients; Counting
Rules." Id.
107. See 8 C.F.R.§214.2 (f)(1)(i) (2000).
[Vol. 10:2
SOLVING THE H1 -B VISA PROBLEM
error in this section of the law is evidence that this new H-1B
amendment lacked rational planning and was once again the
result of a rushed attempt to appease lobbyists before Congress
adjourned for the year. 08
H-1B workers also triumphed through this law. First, the
law increased the portability of H-1B visas so that a worker may
begin new employment immediately upon the filing of a petition
by a new employer and need not wait for the actual approval
from INS.10 9 This important provision facilitates job transferring
for foreign workers and eradicates the anti-immigration stance
of H-1B workers as indentured servants. 110 Foreign workers will
also celebrate the fact that their H-1B status can now be
extended past the six-year limit if their permanent residency
petitions are delayed in processing."' Further, more immigrant
visas will be available to the nationals of oversubscribed
countries, namely India and China, since the law allows unused,
employment-based immigrant visas to be made available
regardless of per-country ceilings. 112
The new law also extends the DOL's authority to
investigate H-1B employers without a complaint if the DOL
receives specific, credible evidence of employer violations. 113 This
should allay H-1B opponents' fear of rogue employers turning a
blind eye to the law or attempting to slip through a supposed
loophole. 114 In the same breath, this section wields an
unfortunate blow by extending the attestation requirement for
H-1B dependent employers. 115 This burden increases the time
108. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
109. See AC21, supra note 95, § 105.
110. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. In addition, free market
economists will glory in this provision as it facilitates resource maximization. See id.
111. See AC21, supra note 95, § 106. This will eliminate some of the hardships
by allowing employers to retain workers long term and employees to make decisions
regarding their future with more certainty.
112. See AC21, supra note 95, § 104. Basically, this should reduce the backlog
for green cards for nationals of high demand countries like India and China.
113. See AC21, supra note 95, § 107. The DOL investigative authority is
extended until September 30, 2003. See id. In December 2000, the DOL
complemented the INA amendment by clarifying when an employer undergoing a
corporate reorganization is in danger of an LCA violation. Basically, the successor
entity need not file a new LCA if it agrees to assume its predecessor entity's
obligations and liabilities under the existing LCA. See Temporary Employment in
the United States of Nonimmigrants Under H-1B Visas, 65 Fed. Reg. 80109, 80112
(Dec. 20, 2000).
114. See Matloff, supra note 23.
115. See AC21, supra note 95, § 107. These attestations are required until
October 1, 2003.
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and expense involved in hiring qualified foreign workers for
those employers deemed H-1B dependent. 116
In addition, the law forces the INS to recycle visas by
returning unused immigrant visas 1 7 or H-1B visas revoked for
fraud back to the pool." 8 This provision will also contribute to a
more accurate count of both H-1B and immigrant visas.
In the next section of the Act, Congress reallocated funds to
the DOL for education and worker training. 19 Since a twin H-
1B bill signed into law the same day increases the education
and training fee from $500 to $1,000,120 and the number of H-1B
visas allotted has almost doubled, the DOL will now control
approximately quadruple the funds. To stave off dubious stares
from DOL critics,' 21 Congress is requiring the DOL to produce a
progress report within one year concerning the number of people
who have completed the training and entered the high-skills
workforce. 22 Critics are sure to give an approving nod to the
distribution of seventy five percent of the grants to workforce
investment boards and the allocation of eighty percent of grants
for skills training in high technology, information technology,
and biotechnology. 23 These specifications are vital because
Congress mandates a majority of funds be spent on the acute
and important high technology labor shortage. Moreover,
Congress funnels the funds to local business experts who are
more aware of the local situation and more agile and effective
actors. However, this section of the law also reinforces the
116. See supra notes 59 & 60 and accompanying text. In December 2000, the
DOL published interim final H-1B regulations effectuating the attestations under
the ACWIA and October 2000 INA amendments for H-1B dependent employers. See
Temporary Employment in the United States of Nonimmigrants Under H-1B Visas,
65 Fed. Reg. 80109 (Dec. 20, 2000).
117. See AC21, supra note 95, § 106(d).
118. See AC21, supra note 95, § 108.
119. See AC21, supra note 95, § 110.
120. See Act to Increase the Fees, supra note 94. One of the likely goals of this
legislation is to deter employers through cost from employing foreign temporary
workers. However, the increase is unlikely to deter the wealthy firms in the high
technology sector which view foreign talent as well worth the price.
121. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
122. See AC21, supra note 95, § 110. Besides requiring this general progress
report, it was wise to force the bureaucratic giant to complete the report within a
year; this should quell the concerns raised about the DOL's slow action. See id.
123. See AC21, supra note 95, § 111. In his statement, President Clinton
acknowledges that the government funds are inadequate to meet the great need to
educate and train workers. He then apportions some of the burden to "high-tech
companies to redouble their efforts to find long-term solutions" to the worker
shortage, such as focusing on elementary school children, minorities, and rural
residents. See Statement by the President, supra note 95.
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concern that the programs will focus on workers with few or no
skills and those at the low end of the skills spectrum, 124 leaving
the IT sector with a continued shortage of highly skilled
workers. Whatever the effect on the high-tech worker shortage,
many critics will agree that this section endeavors to move
towards the important and necessary goal of training the U.S.
workforce.
Another major part of the new H-1B law is the Immigration
Services and Infrastructure Act of 2000.125 This Title directs INS
to take steps to reduce the backlog of visa petitions with the goal
of eliminating the backlog within the year.126 Although an
admirable directive, Congress does not back this INS mission
with any funds, 127 which realistically lessens the chances of
success. Congress has also required informational reports from
INS detailing the backlog situation, plans for reduction and a
data systems assessment. 128
Overall, this more liberal H-1B legislation appears to be an
improvement over the old law. However, capping the H-1B visas
in the face of a growing economy can only be a temporary
bandage, requiring periodic remedial action by Congress.
Further, the Presidential Statement on the H-1B laws exudes
protectionism. President Clinton stated that the "acts recognize
the importance of allowing additional skilled workers into the
United States to work in the short-run, while supporting longer-
term efforts to prepare American workers for the jobs of the new
economy."129 While it is important to look inward for talent and
124. See AC21, supra note 95, § 111 (explaining that "[tiraining shall not
necessarily be at the level of a baccalaureate degree, but preparation for workers at
a broad range along the career ladder"); see also Vaas, supra note 78 (quoting
Democratic Representative Zoe Lofgren of California as stating "[t]raining is good,
but a six-month training program will not fill the need for a Ph.D. or a post-doc in
particle physics").
125. See Immigration Services and Infrastructure Improvements Act of 2000, S.
2045, 106th Cong., Tit. II, § 201(2000).
126. See id. at § 204. Notably, this is the first time Congress has stated its
opinion regarding how long immigration benefits should take to adjudicate.
Congress opined that immigration petitions should be adjudicated within 180 days
of filing, and certain nonimmigrant petitions (including H, L, 0 and P visa petitions)
should be processed within 30 days of filing.
127. See id. Authorizing language is no guarantee that Congress will actually
appropriate any funds.
128. See id. at § 205. This additional reporting requirement, although a good
idea in theory, simply burdens an understaffed INS. If the agency is unable to
process its backlog of immigration petitions, it is doubtful that it has the time and
resources to diligently construct this report.
129. See Statement by the President, supra note 95.
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to utilize these resources in the future, it also seems naive and
isolationist, in view of our increasingly global economy, to
believe the U.S. could remain competitive without the constant
lifeblood from abroad.
Lawmakers equipped with relevant statistics and
information must stand back and objectively view the U.S. labor
situation. Although H-1B opponents' disarmingly loud cry to
protect the American workforce would lead one to think the
United States is literally being invaded by foreign workers, 130
the reality of the situation is that "the H-1B visa program
accounts for just one-tenth of [one percent] of the overall U.S.
workforce." 13' The legislature needs to balance the interests of
protectionist union forces and the IT wave of the future in a
realistic way, giving sufficient deference to IT employers' and
the economy's needs. Since the United States is at risk of losing
both valuable technology companies and talented H-1B visa
holders to foreign countries, 132 it is imperative that the United
States continue its immigration reform.
II. "FEW THINGS ARE HARDER TO PUT UP WITH THAN
THE ANNOYANCE OF A GOOD EXAMPLE" 133:
POSSIBILITIES OF BORROWING FROM CANADA'S
IMMIGRATION POLICY
A. CONTEMPLATING ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE:
EXAMINING CANADIAN IMMIGRATION PROVISIONS FOR
TEMPORARY, TECHNOLOGY PROFESSIONALS
In contrast to U.S. attempts to reign in immigration,
Canada encourages the immigration of skilled workers.
Canada's rate of natural population growth has declined; thus,
Canada needs immigrants if it wants to continue to progress in
the future. 34 To maintain its competitive edge "in a knowledge-
based and service-oriented world economy," Canada must
130. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
131. Joanie Wexler, Should the H-1B Cap Be Raised?, COMPUTERWORLD,
Aug. 28, 2000, at 46.
132. See supra notes 19 & 20 and accompanying text.
133. MARK TWAIN, PUDD'NHEAD WILSON AND THOSE
EXTRAORDINARY TWINS, 92 (Sidney E. Berger ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 1980).
134. See CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION CANADA, CANADA THE
PLACE TO BE: ANNUAL IMMIGRATION PLAN FOR THE YEAR 2000, 6 (1999).
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attract highly skilled workers and hone the skills of its domestic
workforce. 135 In a very pro-immigration stance, the Canadian
government has stated that its year 2000 Immigration Plan
reflects its beliefs in the social and economic benefits of
immigration. 136 The Immigration Plan projects that during
2000, Canada will admit as immigrants between 100,500-
113,300 skilled workers, between 15,000-16,000 business people,
and 1,400 provincial nominees. 137 Canada does not have
immigration quotas, but instead presents an Immigration Plan
to the House of Commons each year; the numbers contained
therein are projections reflecting recent experience, not limits,
so they may be exceeded. 38 As Canada has not attained its
immigration goals in recent years,139 it is making a concerted
effort to attract immigrants.1 40 Canada also encourages the
presence of skilled temporary workers, especially those whose
skills are in short supply in the Canadian labor market and
"whose presence offers Canada a net benefit."' 4 ' All persons
seeking entry to Canada who are not Canadian citizens or
permanent residents ("landed immigrants") must obtain visitor's
status; this status encompasses students, workers, tourists and
others. 142
Pilot projects are one of the easiest methods to obtain
employment authorization and exemption from the Canadian
job validation process. 143 These projects parallel the Labor
Certification process for permanent residency in the United
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 7.
138. See also Benefits to the American Economy of a More Educated Workforce,
supra note 7 at 98 (statement of Stephen F. Clarke, Senior Legal Specialist, Law
Library of Congress).
139. See CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION CANADA, supra note 134, at 10
(noting that in 1999 Canada had projected between 100,200-111,200 skilled worker
immigrants and approximately 17,700-19,700 business immigrants; however, during
1999 Canada actually welcomed only 89,300 skilled workers and 13,200 business
immigrants); see also Benefits to the American Economy of a More Educated
Workforce, supra note 7 at 98 (1999).
140. See Benefits to the American Economy of a More Educated Workforce, supra
note 7, at 34, 37 (acknowledging that the Canadian immigration system works very
well, but recognizing that the Canadian system faces different population and
economic dynamics than the United States).
141. See CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION CANADA, supra note 134, at 15.
142. See CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION CANADA, supra note 134, at 15;
Asher Frankel & Gary Endelman, Go North Young Man, Go North: Working
Temporarily in Canada from an American Perspective, 77 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 73, 75 (Jan. 14, 2000).
143. See Frankel & Endelman, supra note 142, at 80-87.
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States.'" The pilot projects require a national job validation
letter, which effectively validates a whole class of foreign
workers and facilitates the employment authorization process.145
Presently two such pilot projects are in place: one is for the
spouses of employment authorization holders; the other is for
software development workers. 46
The Software Development Worker Pilot Project germinated
when Canadian employers in the software industry voiced
concern over a shortage of qualified, high-level software
developers. 47  Several groups, including Citizenship and
Immigration Canada, Human Resources Development Canada,
Industry Canada, and the Software Human Resources Council,
worked together to establish the pilot program and streamline
work authorization for the needed workers. 48 Each job
description sets out specific "skills, duties, experience,
education, and language ability required for each of the seven
positions." 49 If a person's qualifications or the job offer does not
fall within the descriptions, that person must apply for
employment authorization the normal way. 150 Canada began the
Software Development Worker Pilot Project in May of 1997 and
has extended it because of its success. 5 1
Although the Canadian policies for temporary IT workers
are not perfect, these laws have been more heartily embraced by
144. See Frankel & Endelman, supra note 142, at 81. Canada is not relying
entirely on the pilot projects to ameliorate the worker shortages. The Canadian
government also addresses labor shortages through education and training. See
Software Human Resource Council, Software Development Worker Pilot Project: Pilot
Evaluation Introduction, at http://www.shrc.ca/search/index.html (last visited Jan.
10, 2001).
145. See Frankel & Endelman, supra note 142, at 81.
146. See Frankel & Endelman, supra note 142, at 81.
147. See Frankel & Endelman, supra note 142, at 81.
148. See Frankel & Endelman, supra note 142, at 81 Human Resource
Development Canada collaborated with industry, particularly the Software Human
Resources Council to identify the needed skills and then to create job descriptions.
See id.
149. Frankel & Endelman, supra note 142, at 82.
150. See Frankel & Endelman, supra note 142, at 82.
151. See Frankel & Endelman, supra note 142, at 81. An evaluation of the
Software Development Worker Pilot Project reports that a majority of firms
supported the project and the pilot workers were highly satisfied with it. This
evaluation further enumerates the strengths of the project, including its speed and
simplicity in facilitating entry into Canada, its highly cost-effective method of
enabling employers to obtain highly educated workers, and its ability to increase
Canada's attractiveness for high tech workers. See Software Human Resource
Council, Software Development Worker Pilot Project: Pilot Evaluation Introduction,
at http://www.shrc.ca/search/index.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2001).
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needy employers than their poor Southern cousin, the H-1B
program.
B. FOLLOWING THE DOCTOR'S ORDER: IMPLEMENTING
CANADIAN STRATEGIES IN THE AILING H-1B LAW
Canadian pilot projects, which help alleviate worker
shortages and facilitate the entry of talented foreign workers,
stand superior to the H-1B program for several reasons. First,
these projects do not impose an annual limit on the number of
foreign workers who may enter the country. Second, the projects
are implemented with relative ease. Third, the foreign worker's
employment status is separable from his or her visitor's status.
Finally, the pilot projects do not impose restraints hindering a
foreign worker's transition to permanent residency status.
Unlike the H-1B program,152 Canada does not limit the
number of foreign workers who may enter the country to be
employed in a pilot project. These flexible projects mirror the
Canadian stance on immigration flows. 153 Canada is not tied to
arbitrary numbers like the United States; rather, the Canadian
government is intent upon meeting the needs of employers,
eliminating the specified worker shortages, and remaining
competitive in the global marketplace. This does not mean the
projects are allowed to run amuck by ruthlessly taking jobs from
qualified Canadians. On the contrary, the projects are closely
monitored, and if a shortage persists upon the project
termination date, the project is extended to meet the foreseeable
need. 54 This quotaless system is far superior to the current H-
1B program; it would eradicate the congressional guesswork and
pacify needy employers.
Next, in contrast to the complex H-1B visa application that
leaves anxious United States employers at the mercy of both the
DOL and INS, the Canadian pilot project mends employers and
government in a seamless process. Canadian employers are
involved in the projects from the start by alerting the
government of an apparent worker shortage, and then when the
shortage is verified, by helping create the specific job
descriptions for the available positions. 55 This cooperation
between government and industry undoubtedly culminates in a
152. See AC21 supra note 95 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
154. See generally Frankel & Endelman, supra note 142, at 81.
155. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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more efficient information flow and results in a more practical
and complete project. In fact, software industry employers and
foreign workers alike have expressed much support for and
satisfaction with the pilot project because of its cost-
effectiveness in obtaining workers and its quick and simple
process. 156
If the United States used pilot projects, government and
industry could handle various labor shortages in a more efficient
and objective manner. Small, representative groups from
different regions would meet to pinpoint the exact occupational
need. Then, because articulating an estimated number of foreign
workers is an inexact science, there would be no H-1B cap for
this particular specialty occupation for a specified period of
time. If the labor shortage was ongoing, the government and
industry group would meet again to extend the cap-less period.
This idea would satisfy both the government, which is intent
upon retaining the cap,157 and free market economists and
industry, who insist upon a freer flow of resources. 158 Moreover,
it would be flexible enough to respond to any labor shortage in
the economy. 159
Canadian immigration policy offers a further bonus in its
separation of the visitor and employment statuses. The idea
that the visitor's status is separable from the employment
authorization is an attractive concept. 160 In effect, the Canadian
government gives foreigners layers of authorization for entry
into Canada. The first basic layer is the visitor's status. This
status allows general entry into Canada and encompasses
students, workers, tourists and others.' 61 If a foreign visitor
would like to work in Canada, the Canadian government gives
another layer of authorization, the employment authorization.
16 2
The beauty of this system is that if foreign workers become
unemployed, they do not automatically lose their reason for
being in Canada. The visitor's status continues as a safety net,
allowing them to remain in Canada and seek new employment.
Conversely, the H-1B visa rests solely on employment in the
156. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
157. See Statement by the President, supra note 95.
158. See supra notes 9-16 and accompanying text.
159. In this sense, this plan is superior to the inflexible "T" visa proposal which
is only for foreign nationals completing a post-secondary degree in mathematics,
science, engineering or computer science. See, e.g., H.R. 2687, 106th Cong. (1999).
160. See generally Frankel & Endelman, supra note 142, at 75.
161. See Frankel & Endelman, supra note 142, at 75.
162. See Frankel & Endelman, supra note 142, at 80-87.
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United States.163 The H-1B visa does not simultaneously
embody a visitor's status. Therefore, when H-1B workers lose
their jobs, they lose their reason for being present in the United
States and must leave as soon as possible. 164 This strong tie to
employment is what anti-immigration forces pounce on when
comparing H-1B workers to indentured servants since their
mobility is severely limited. 65 Section 105 of AC21 has helped
the situation by increasing the portability of H-1B visas. 166
However, that still does not allow an unemployed H-1B worker
to remain in the United States and be a tourist. Thus, the
Canadian policy would offer more flexibility in this regard.
Finally, the Canadian pilot project would be a vast
improvement upon the H-1B program because it would not
hinder a foreign worker's adjustment to permanent residency.
Even with the new AC21 provisions, 67 it is still difficult and
time-consuming for an H-1B holder to adjust to permanent
residency in the United States. In sharp contrast, Canada has
recognized the value of highly-skilled immigrants and has
shaped its immigration policy accordingly.1 6 The Canadian
government understands that temporary workers often stay
permanently, and that highly skilled workers actually create
jobs, stimulating the economy. Although it is true that Canada
and the United States have different immigration and economic
needs, 169 the latter makes a fatal mistake in undervaluing
highly skilled foreign workers.
III. CONCLUSION
The H-1B visa program is a vital part of U.S. immigration
law that allows for the influx of temporary foreign workers in
specialty occupations. Today this visa type has become
especially critical for employers in the high technology sector
because of the pronounced shortage in this area. However, the
H-1B visa's quota and time restrictions, not to mention the
163. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
164. In fact, if an H-1B employee "is dismissed from employment by the
employer before the end of the period of authorized admission, the employer shall be
liable for the reasonable costs of return transportation of the alien." INA §
214(c)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(5)(A) (1999).
165. See supra note 21.
166. See supra notes 25 95 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 111-112 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 140-141 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 140.
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labyrinthine regulations and complex application procedure, are
incredibly burdensome to employers and foreign workers alike.
Recent H-1B legislation has made headway towards liberalizing
the temporary worker program, but the H-1B cap and visa
duration regulations remain persistent problems. Implementing
the superior Canadian ideas of pilot projects and a fallback
visitor's status would inject efficiency and flexibility into the
U.S. H-1B program. Thus in the end, a stable, streamlined H-1B
program would brighten the outlook of Congress, which need not
broach the same problem every couple years; employers, who
could hire critical talent; and foreign workers, who could
maintain their status and attain their dreams.
